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Abstract  
This article draws on major theories of committee organization to explain committee 
chair selection in contexts with high informational and organizational constraints. We test 
our theoretical expectations through a series of fixed effects conditional logit models ran 
on an original dataset which includes all legislators who have served in the Romanian 
Chamber of Deputies from 1992 to 2012. The findings indicate that sector knowledge 
matters more for committee chair selection in the first post-communist terms, while chair 
seniority and party credentials acquire relevance later on. The effect of sector knowledge 
is stronger than that of chair seniority for the committees that MPs perceive to be the 
most important, while party leaders have privileged access to the chair position 
irrespective of how salient the committee is. 
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Introduction 
The composition and functioning of parliamentary committees in European democracies has 
been extensively studied in the literature, with most research focusing on the formal rules of 
selection, the absence of official seniority requirements (Mattson and Strøm 1995; Strøm 1998; 
Yläoutinen and Hallerberg 2012) and the allocation of committee chairs between parties with 
emphasis on the factors which affect a proportional allocation or strategic use for shadowing 
purposes (Carroll and Cox 2012). However, little is known about the empirical patterns driving 
the selection of committee chairs in Europe. More specifically, it remains unclear whether the 
professional traits of members of parliament (MPs) facilitate their access to the highest 
committee office. This question gets even more challenging in new democracies where the 
committee chair selection takes place under three specific informational and organizational 
constraints (Olson and Crowther 2002). These constraints are: limited parliamentary expertise 
to be mobilized, ideologically fuzzy parliamentary parties which are also more prone to splits or 
hopping, and high electoral volatility, which is likely to make calculations on individual electoral 
gains from committee assignment irrelevant (Mansfeldova et al 2004; Ciftci et al 2008; Heller 
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and Mershon 2009; Gherghina 2014). In such a context where political parties are the main 
actors, the main expectation is that committee chair allocation would follow partisan 
preferences and make strategic use of the MPs' traits.  
This article tests whether this is indeed the case and argues that three particular 
individual features may influence the likelihood of committee chair selection in a post-
communist democracy. Thus, it aims to identify the extent to which the MPs' sector knowledge, 
legislative experience and party credentials have an effect on the selection of committee chairs. 
The analysis is conducted longitudinally to observe whether the three effects change over time 
with the increase in parliamentary professionalization. In doing so, the article measures for the 
first time the level of parliamentary policy specialization in a young democracy, but also 
provides the first investigation of the determinants of committee chair selection in a European 
context. The only study on the topic outside the United States focused on the Brazilian 
Congress (Santos and Renno 2004). We build on the major committee organization theories – 
the distributive, the informational and the partisan approach – and use a unique dataset which 
includes all the politicians who have served in the Romanian Chamber of Deputies from 1992 to 
2012. The matched longitudinal data allows us to measure not only the impact of general 
committee leadership experience but also the effect of parliamentary policy specialization via 
membership and office in the same committee in the past. The Romanian case is the 
appropriate setting to test such effects for two reasons. First, it is illustrative for the high 
informational and organizational constraints which occur in new democracies. Political parties 
hold the upper hand in office allocation within Parliament, while individual electoral incentives 
play little role due to the high MP turnover rates. Nevertheless, like in other post-communist 
Parliaments (Chiru 2010), in Romania there is a remarkable continuity at the level of committee 
membership and committee office, despite frequent party switching and individual turnover 
rates. Second, Romanian political parties have also developed extensive clientelistic networks 
and they are much more interested in office and votes than in policy objectives (Gherghina and 
Chiru 2013). Given all these elements, Romania represents a hard case among new democracies 
to test the role of MPs’ individual features (related to their professional record and 
parliamentary expertise) for obtaining a committee chair.  
The remainder of this article proceeds as follows. The first section reviews the major 
theories on committee organization and formulates several testable hypotheses about 
committee chair selection. Next, we evaluate the main powers and structural attributes of 
parliamentary committees in Romania and describe the formal rules which govern the selection 
of committee chairs. The third section describes the research design with emphasis on data, 
variable operationalization and method. The fourth section presents the multivariate statistical 
analyses that look both at the longitudinal evolution of committee chair selection and at the 
recruitment for the most important committees. The conclusions discuss the implications of the 
results and possible further directions of research.   
 
Drivers of committee chair selection 
The main scope of the theories of committee organization concerns the formation of 
committees and the assignment of members in committees (Groseclose and King 2001). Due to 
their origin and focus on the peculiar institutional setting of the US Congress, some of their 
assumptions and findings do not travel too well even though this limitation applies more to 
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some theories - particularly the distributive perspective - than to others. Nevertheless, these 
theories have empirical implications for the selection of committee chairs, which can be tested 
on a matched longitudinal sample such as ours. Consequently, the framework below is 
informed by the theories of committee organization in the attempt to create an explanatory 
model for committee chair selection. We bring together many of the usual suspects 
emphasized in the literature to test their explanatory power in contexts in which parties and 
legislators face high informational and organizational constraints. These constraints take the 
shape of limited parliamentary expertise, ideological fuzziness and organizational instability of 
parliamentary parties, and highly volatile electorate that make individual electoral calculations 
unreliable. Under these circumstances, we argue that three major determinants are likely to 
influence the committee chair selection: sector knowledge, relevant legislative experience and 
the party credentials of the MP.  
To begin with, all three theoretical perspectives adapted from congressional theories to 
the specific context of parliaments with informational and organizational constraints emphasize 
the role of sector expertise for committee chair nominations (H1). According to the 
informational perspective of committee organization the parliamentary majority should be 
interested in using efficiently the expertise of its members by nominating them in committees 
which allow further specialization in the policy area in which they already have experience 
(Krehbiel 1992). Different empirical analyses emphasized the merits of this perspective. On the 
one hand, sector knowledge influences the committee assignment in legislatures as different as 
the European Parliament and Ireland (McElroy 2006; Hansen 2011: 357). On the other hand, 
academic training or a professional career in the policy field covered by the committee turned 
out to be a major predictor of committee chair selection in Brazil (Santos and Renno 2004: 65). 
The partisan perspective would also suggest that sector knowledge is an important 
precondition for nominating committee chairs. This is so because by nominating someone 
without sector knowledge as a chair, parties run the risk of seeing their preferred policy 
outcomes diverted by more knowledgeable legislators from other parties, or by their own party 
members with more radical views, in a process similar to the potential policy drift of non-
specialist ministers faced with experienced bureaucrats. Thus, it is crucial for parties to select 
committee chairs who embody the right balance between political skill and expertise, a 
criterion which was also heavily emphasized by the literature on the selection of ministers (De 
Winter 1991; Dowding and Dumont 2009).  
The distributive theory entails that the committee members are 'high demanders' and 
they would be ideological outliers compared to the median party member (Weingast and 
Marshall 1988; Groseclose and King 2001). While this perspective explains that structures in 
Parliament exist to support the electoral needs of MPs, the political reality is somewhat 
different. In many new European democracies political parties dominate the entire process of 
nominations. The high levels of electoral volatility and rates of MP turnover (Chiru 2010; 
Gherghina 2014) place calculations regarding individual electoral gains on a secondary position 
when offices are allocated. Consequently, the engagement in distributive politics of the 
legislators is fairly limited and is replaced by a more institutional logic aimed at consolidating 
the position of the party. Accordingly, the abilities that recommend the nomination of 
committee chairs are not unequivocally linked to the MPs’ skills in directing benefits to their 
constituents. Instead, political parties may be inclined to nominate those representatives who 
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have sector knowledge and can boost the party’s image and policy success. Knowledgeable 
chairs are thus better able to convey an image of professionalism and play an active role in 
shaping policies which would eventually increase the party's electoral appeal and only indirectly 
their own re-election chances.    
The second main effect is driven by the legislative experience of the MPs. A major role in 
this respect is played by committee seniority, the salience of which has been emphasized by 
both the distributive and the informational theories. However, the distributive theory of 
committee organization is the least suited to explain committee chair selection in a context 
with a weak electoral connection, where re-election depends mainly on the party leadership 
decisions regarding placement on the party list, and where parties control the distribution of 
parliamentary office. This is the case because the theory maintains that legislators are mainly 
motivated by re-election concerns and they self-select into the committees that enable them to 
obtain particularistic benefits for their constituency, such as pork barrel projects (Weingast and 
Marshall 1988; Groseclose and King 2001), or to those committees that have policy jurisdiction 
over issues which are of great interest to their constituents. Although in Europe the parties 
control committee assignment and chair selection, and seniority is nowhere formally 
institutionalized as a precondition for committee office, it is safe to assume that committee 
seniority still plays a role in the process.  
For most of the last half a century, seniority was all that matter for committee chair 
selection in the US Congress. The chair would always be the longest (continuously) serving 
member of the committee (Deering and Wahlbeck 2006: 229). Even in contexts like the 
European Parliament, in which seniority is not institutionalized, previous membership in a 
committee is a strong predictor of committee assignment (McElroy 2006). Although other 
scholars treat it is as a form of 'inertia in committee chair selection' (Santos and Renno 2004: 
61), a type of serial correlation that needs to be controlled for, we believe this phenomenon 
has a substantive meaning which is in line with the predictions of the informational theory. 
Thus, if the legislative majority is interested in cultivating policy specialization it should favor 
MPs who served in that committee in the past and even more so, MPs who were chairs of that 
committee, when selecting legislators for committee leadership positions.  
In light of these arguments, we distinguish between five components of parliamentary 
experience. Starting with the three most specific variables, which imply the highest level of 
policy specialization, a chair position in the same committee in the past (H2a), experience as a 
member in that committee (H2b) or experience as a deputy chair or secretary of the same 
committee in the past (H2c) are likely to foster nomination as committee chair. At a more 
general level, just holding committee office in the previous term (irrespective of committee) 
can positively influence the selection as committee chair (H2d) because of the experience 
acquired in leading committee sessions, manipulating the committee agenda, or negotiating 
with the leadership of the Chamber. At the most general level of experience, a long MP career 
(H2e) may positively impact the selection as committee chair, given that veteran MPs generally 
have more knowledge of the legislative process and can rely on a network of connections in 
other parties which could be instrumental in forging deals in the committees. 
The third main effect highlights the salience of party credentials for a committee chair 
position, namely a high profile of the MPs in the party. According to the partisan theory, parties 
act as 'legislative cartels', which use the committee system to discipline their members and 
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achieve their policy goals (Cox and McCubbins 1993). From this perspective, allocating the 
committee offices to party leaders is a rational strategy for parties that want 'to monitor the 
cooperation and compliance' of their members in committees (Ciftci et al 2008) and to 
maximize their policy influence. Party leaders would also be more reliable in using the negative 
agenda power enjoyed by committee chairs to delay or block bills detrimental to the party or, 
conversely to make use of positive agenda power to promote the bills favored by the party (Cox 
and McCubbins 2005). The appointment of party leaders is even more likely in situations of 
coalition governments in which parties use committee chairs to keep tabs on the ministers of 
their coalition partners (Carroll and Cox 2012). This is so because national party leaders are 
potentially more informed with respect to the issues that divide the coalition. Last but not least, 
we have to take into account individual motivation: party leaders may exploit their power to 
reserve for themselves the most desirable committee seats the party is entitled to (Yordanova 
2009: 265) and further use them as a stepping stone for a ministerial career or for increasing 
their policy influence.  
 
H1: Sector knowledge increases the likelihood of being selected committee chair. 
H2: Chair seniority (H2a), committee seniority (H2b), committee office seniority (2c), chair 
positions in other committees (H2d) and a long parliamentary career (H2e) increase the 
likelihood of being selected committee chair. 
H3: Party leaders are more likely to be selected committee chairs. 
 
The reasoning behind some of these effects is not particular to new democracies and are widely 
applicable to a broader range of countries. However, the expectations about the longitudinal 
variation of these effects bring relevant details to the broader picture. New democracies faced 
several transformations and phases from their regime change to the current situation. These 
phases include transition to democracy, acquiring a democratic status, consolidation of 
democracy and sometimes backsliding (e.g. as it is the case with Hungary nowadays). The 
intensity of effects is closely linked to these phases. We would expect sector knowledge (H1) to 
be a key determinant of committee chair selection particularly during transition years for at 
least two reasons. First, one relevant feature of the legislatures in those periods is the absence 
of past parliamentary policy specialization due to the massive turnover and the different nature 
of parliamentary politics in authoritarian regimes (i.e. their rubber stamp character). Second, 
the informational needs of the legislature are more pressing because of the lack of staff and 
institutional resources (Ostrow 2002: 201; Ilonszki 1995: 198; Roper and Crowther 1998: 420).  
At a later phase, when these features fade away or become less predominant, the role 
of seniority (H2) is likely to be important in committee chair nomination. In post-communist 
Europe, the professionalization of parliamentary elites is positively correlated with the number 
of parliamentary terms and with the democratic development of the country (Kopecky 2001; 
Norton & Olson 2007; Semenova et al. 2013). Based on these observations, we expect the 
effect of seniority to increase after the transition phase and gradually replace the initial 
importance of sector knowledge. Party leadership (H3) is an important component in the life of 
a political party, with functions that do not depend on democratization or parliamentary 
development (Cross and Pilet 2016). Accordingly, we expect its effect to be relatively steady 
throughout the investigated time frame.  
6 
 
 
The Romanian Parliament and its committees 
Both formal rules and the parliamentary practice indicate that parties are the main actors in the 
Romanian Parliament, not the committees. Since electronic records of roll-call voting were 
introduced in 2006, discipline seems relatively high, cohesion levels averaging more than 90% 
(Gherghina and Chiru 2014). In contrast, party switching was throughout the analyzed period an 
important phenomenon with an average percentage of 15% MPs defecting from their original 
parliamentary party group (Stefan et al. 2012; Gherghina 2016). The Constitutional Court 
decided in 2010 (CCR 2010) that a group of independent MPs can form a parliamentary party 
group and have access to the associated spoils: representation in the Permanent Bureau of the 
Chamber, committee leadership positions proportional to their size, staff etc. 'Independent 
MPs' are those representatives who have renounced their party affiliation, as only one 
independent has ever been elected to Parliament and that happened in 1990.  
Several observers noted the structural stability and gradual institutionalization of the 
parliamentary committee system in Romania (Chiva 2007: 205; Chiru 2010), but their powers 
received less attention, the sole exception being the comparative study of committees in 
Central and Eastern Europe by Yläoutinen and Hallerberg (2012). In order to evaluate how 
strong the Romanian committees are, we coded their powers and structural features as 
established by the Standing Orders and other legal documents. In doing so we followed the 
methodology proposed by André et al (2016), which itself draws heavily on Strøm (1998). 
Committees in the Romanian Parliament are relatively strong in their capacity to acquire 
information (Table 1). Thus, they can compel both ministers and civil servants to attend their 
sessions (art. 48-49). Each standing committee has its own staff and there has always been a 
high level of correspondence between their domains and the policy areas of ministers. In the 
last term analyzed 16 committees had policy jurisdictions that fully matched that of a single 
cabinet minister, while for three the match is only partial.  
 
Table 1 about here 
 
From 1992 to 2012, the number of standing committees has gradually increased from 14 to 19, 
without including in this count the joint standing committees formed with the Senate. For the 
computation of the corresponding score in Table 1, that takes into account the minimum and 
the maximum number of committees in the André et al (2016) sample of 31 parliamentary 
democracies we used as reference the number of committees that was in place for the longest 
time in the analyzed period: 17.  
 Unlike what Yläoutinen and Hallerberg (2008) claim, the Romanian committees do not 
have the right to initiate legislation. This is restricted by Constitution to the cabinet, individual 
MPs or 100,000 citizens (art. 75). However, the committees do enjoy substantial rewriting 
ability. Bills are always considered by committees prior to the plenary stage and the plenary 
votes on the text of the bill as amended by the committees, not separately on the initial bill and 
the committee amendments (art 105-107). The Permanent Bureau of the Chamber establishes 
the deadlines for the standing committees to consider each bill (art. 67), thus we coded the 
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control of the timetable as 0. The committees have to submit their reports in 14-60 days or 
within three days when the urgency procedure is adopted (Bågenholm 2008: 93).1 
The overall value of the index of committee strength is 0.73, a score surpassed by only 4 
legislatures in the sample examined by André et al (2016). It is worth noting that two of these 
legislatures are Eastern European (Lithuania and Estonia), while the score for Hungarian 
committees is only marginally smaller. As noted by André et al (2016: 5) legislatures 'in Central 
and Eastern Europe tend to have more extensive powers, having modeled their committee 
structures after the U.S. example'. This further justifies our argument that Romanian 
committees are illustrative for Eastern European legislatures. 
The formal powers granted to committees in Romania are also matched by their actual 
role in the parliamentary practice. Thus, one author argues that after the 2001 constitutional 
revision the gravity center of the legislative process moved from the plenary sessions to 
committees, particularly through the substantial reduction of plenary debates (Ionescu 2011: 
211-2) and the fact that the committee report recommendation (to adopt or reject the bill) now 
structures much more the debates2. Given this level of strength and the fact that multiparty 
government is the norm in Romania, which in turn creates substantial incentives for keeping 
tabs on government coalition partners through committee oversight (Martin and Vanberg 
2011), Romanian parties should be very much interested in the allocation of committee chairs. 
 
Rules regarding committee chairs 
The Standing Orders say that the party group leaders make the nominations for the committee 
offices, following negotiations between the parties and that 'the bureau of the committee 
should respect 'as much as possible' the political configuration of the Chamber' (art. 41 of the 
1994 Standing Orders). The nominations need to be approved by the majority of committee 
members, but these votes seem just a formality as it is the case in many other European 
Parliaments (Strøm 1998: 41). An MP can lose the committee office at the request of the party 
which proposed her or at the request of 1/3 of the committee members and if the majority of 
the committee members vote for it. (art. 41).3  
The 1994 Standing Orders also established that the committee bureau is limited to one 
chairman, two deputy chairmen and two secretaries. Collectively, the members of the 
committee bureau propose the internal functioning rules and the daily agenda, allocate tasks to 
the members and can create sub-committees (art. 42). The chairman leads the committee 
sessions, represents the committee in the relation with the leadership of the Chamber and with 
other committees and can invite experts, state officials or other citizens for hearings (art. 43). 
The chairman also proposes rapporteurs for each bill that is examined by the committee (art. 
52) and summons the members for committee meetings.4 The deputy chairmen exercise the 
                                                          
1 Since 2009, the committee chairs have the right to ask for the extension of the deadline a maximum of two times, 
but the final decision regarding the extension rests with the Permanent Bureau of the Chamber. 
2 Ionescu (2011) argues that since 2001 if the committee report recommends the rejection of the bill the debate is 
very short. 
3 In 2005 the threshold for the committee members to request the removal of a committee leader was raised to 
more than half of the members. However, the Constitutional Court ruled this provision unconstitutional in the 
same year. Currently, only the parliamentary party group that nominated the legislator can request the removal.  
4 During parliamentary sessions the committees convene once a week. 
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duties of the chairman when she is absent, whereas the secretary is in charge with keeping the 
record regarding presence and votes as well as with drafting the committee documents (art. 44-
45). None of the above provisions were modified in the analyzed period. 
 
Data, measurements and method 
The hypotheses are tested using a data set that includes all 1,771 members of the Chamber of 
Deputies (lower chamber of the Romanian Parliament) that have served between 1992 and 
2012, i.e., in the first five parliamentary terms.5 MPs that were serving as ministers were 
excluded for the periods in which they were part of the government. The pooled sample 
includes 2079 cases, because some MPs were members in more than one standing committee. 
Data on party affiliation, parliamentary activities and committee membership comes from Tufis 
(2015a, 2015b, 2015c, 2015d, 2015e) and we collected information regarding sector 
knowledge, past and current committee positions, the list position of the MPs and vote share. 
The dependent variable of this study is dichotomous: the committee members who were 
selected chairs are coded 1, while all others are coded 0.  
 In addition to the main effects discussed above we control for several variables that 
could have an effect on the selection of committee chairs: electoral security, district magnitude, 
the number of committees in which the MP is a member, whether the MP holds a Chamber 
office and mandate duration. The expectations regarding electoral security are rather 
ambivalent. On the one hand, parties could nominate as committee chairs the most vulnerable 
MPs, in order to help them gather more votes. On the other hand, the partisan theory of 
committee organization suggests that because the costs for policy specialization are high, 
parties will tend to select as committee chairs those MPs who are less likely to lose their seats 
(Hansen 2011: 351). Under closed list PR, MPs from counties with smaller district magnitude 
could be more interested in constituency service than in policy issues and committee work 
(Carey and Shugart 1995), as long as committees are not able to allocate pork barrel projects to 
constituencies.6 We control for the number of committee memberships, to account for the 
possibility that an MP might increase her chances of being selected as a chair by serving in more 
committees. Mandate duration is included in the model because MPs with replacement 
mandates or those who resign early in the term have less of a chance to be selected as 
committee chairs. Rather similarly, legislators who hold a more important 'mega-seat', such as 
members of the Permanent Bureau of the Chamber have less time and desire to serve as 
committee chairs.  
 
Variable operationalization 
Sector knowledge, the first independent variable, is a cumulative index of education and 
expertise (field of work before getting a parliamentary seat). Each of the two was originally 
coded as a dummy variable in which 1 is the equivalent of a match between the committee in 
which the MP works and his/her education, on the one hand, and expertise, on the other hand. 
We focused on both education and expertise because although the two are highly correlated 
                                                          
5 The 1990-92 Parliament served as a Constitutional Assembly, hence we excluded it. We also excluded the MPs 
that represent national minorities because they ran for reserved seats and do not have a party. 
6 In Romania budgetary transfers and infrastructure projects are allocated exclusively at government level. 
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there is a non-negligible MPs with a different expertise than education. The resulting index is 
coded on a three-point ordinal scale where 0 stands for no match between committee and 
either education or expertise, 1 is a match of the committee with one of the two variables, and 
2 is a match of the committee with both education and expertise (for details, see Appendix 1).  
Chair seniority, committee office seniority, committee seniority, and other committee 
office are a series of dummies. Chair seniority is coded 1 for those MPs who were chairs of the 
same committee in the past. Committee office seniority is coded 1 if the MP was deputy chair 
or secretary of the same committee in the past. Committee seniority indicates simple 
membership, with no office, in the same committee in the past. Ideally we would be able to use 
a continuous measure indicating the exact duration of membership, to distinguish between 
those MPs who were members of the committee for just a couple of months and those who 
served several terms in it. Unfortunately, such detailed data was not readily available. Finally, 
other committee office is coded 1 for the committee members who were chairs or deputy 
chairs of any committee in the previous legislative term. Legislative experience measures the 
years of membership in Parliament before the analyzed term in office. National party leader is a 
dichotomous variable in which 1 stands for a party leadership position at national level (e.g. 
president, vice-president, member in the national executive etc.).  
In 2008, Romania shifted from a closed-list proportional representation (PR) system to 
an original mixed-member proportional system in which all MPs are elected from Single 
Member Districts (SMDs). In order to have a measure of electoral security that is comparable 
across the two electoral systems we use the indicator proposed by Olivella and Tavits (2014). 
Electoral security is computed as the difference between the party list share of mandates (for 
the 1992-2004 terms) or the candidate share of votes (for the 2008 term) and Lijphart’s (1999) 
effective electoral threshold, which is   where M is the district magnitude. The latter is 
measured in our analysis as the difference between the party list share of seats (for the PR 
terms) or the candidate share of votes (for the 2008 term) and the effective electoral threshold. 
The mandate duration is a count measure of the days of membership in the legislature in the 
analyzed term. Chamber office is a dichotomous variable where 1 stands for membership in the 
Permanent Bureau of the Chamber during the analyzed legislative term. The number of 
committee memberships counts the committees in which the committee member worked 
during a term, including standing, special and inquiry committees, as well as joint standing 
committees with the Senate (the upper Chamber of the Romanian Parliament). 
Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics for the dependent variable and the covariates 
used in the models. One of the impressive findings is that MPs have an average score of 0.9 on 
the sector knowledge variable, which means that there are many legislators who have either 
academic training or professional expertise in the policy field of the committee they serve in.   
 
Table 2 about here 
 
We use the fixed effects conditional logit model (Chamberlain estimator) because it is more 
appropriate for the data structure and the purpose of our analysis. This is so because MPs are 
nested in panels (the committees) and they run in specific races for each committee chair 
position. The races vary both in the number of competitors, prestige of the position and in the 
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characteristics of the choice alternatives (i.e. the characteristics of the MPs who could be the 
chairs). Thus, we compare the MPs' attributes and quality only with the other MPs who are 
members of the same committee and were potential candidates for the same position (Cann 
2008: 277). Moreover, the binary DV makes the Chamberlain estimator the appropriate choice, 
since McFadden's standard conditional logit estimator was designed and is used for multiple, 
not dichotomous, choices or outcomes. The following section includes the multivariate 
statistical analyses which were ran with two purposes: to observe the effect of the 
hypothesized relationships across legislative terms and to identify differences in committee 
chair selection patterns according to committee importance, as evaluated by the legislators 
themselves. 
 
Assessing the effect of knowledge, experience and party credentials  
The conditional fixed effects logit models in Table 3 present the results separately for each 
legislative term, and the findings of the model ran on the pooled data.7 The values of the 
McFadden's R2 indicate a better fit of the models for the 1992, 2000 and 2008 legislative terms 
compared to all other models. The odds ratios in Table 2 show that indeed sector knowledge 
was a crucial predictor of committee chair selection in the first terms after the transition to 
democracy. Indeed, in the second and third legislature analyzed MPs with sector knowledge 
(education and prior activity) in the committees’ policy area were on average two times more 
likely to become chairs of that committee as opposed to the MPs without such knowledge. As 
expected, with the passage of time and the increased accumulation of committee level 
expertise this explanatory factor loses its importance. Thus, for the 2004 and 2008 terms, the 
coefficients of this variable fail to reach conventional levels of statistical significance and their 
strength is lower compared to 1996 and 2000, and quite comparable with what we observed in 
1992. The non-effect of sector knowledge for the 1992 term is mostly due to the composition of 
Parliament after that election. The 1992 elections brought the largest turnover in the entire 
analyzed period with 70% of the Members of the Chamber of Deputies being elected for the 
first time. This made past membership in a committee and experience as committee chair much 
scarcer resources and probably increased their value compared to sector knowledge. 
Unfortunately, this interpretation cannot be fully tested given the absence of data on chair 
seniority for this term. 
 
Table 3 about here 
 
We observe that in the last two terms chair seniority becomes the most important predictor for 
a positive selection outcome. Thus, MPs who were chairs in the same committee in the past 
have an extremely high probability of being selected for the position again: their likelihood is 
6.5 times higher than that of colleagues lacking such experience in 2004 and 9.6 higher in 2008. 
Its effect gets stronger over time, as theoretically expected. Overall, chair seniority is also the 
most important predictor in the pooled model. The other variables measuring committee 
                                                          
7 We also controlled for party size, past parliamentary activity, party switching, party magnitude, age, gender and 
wealth (for the last two legislative terms). None of these made a substantial difference and were not included in 
the models.  
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seniority and committee leadership experience are not statistically significant, although their 
strength varies and their effect is in the expected direction in most regressions. When it comes 
to the general legislative experience, there is no empirical support for the hypothesized effect 
(H2e): the length of the parliamentary service appears to make no difference for the likelihood 
to occupy a committee chair position.  
Legislators who had a leadership position (H3) in their parties seem significantly more 
likely to be selected as committee chairs in each of the last three terms analyzed, as well as in 
the pooled sample. In the 2000-2008 terms the probability that party elites would receive the 
committee chair position was between 3 and 5 times higher than that of legislators who were 
not part of national party leadership. The results go partially against our expectation regarding 
the longitudinal trend: since the role and functions of party leaders did not change over time, 
we expected a consistent effect of this variable. However, for the first two terms the effect 
goes against the hypothesized relationship and changes starting 2000 when it provides 
empirical support to the theoretical expectation. A possible explanation might be that party 
leaders became more interested in committee chair positions with the passage of time, having 
acknowledged their importance for a future ministerial career.   
In order to grasp better the magnitude of the main effects, Figure 1 below illustrates the 
estimated effects from the pooled model using 95% confidence intervals.8 Intervals that cross 
the vertical line inserted for odds ratio of 1 imply that the corresponding effects have not 
reached the 95% statistical significance level. 
 
Figure 1 about here 
 
Among the control variables, electoral security and mandate duration have no effect on 
committee chair selection, whereas the number of committee memberships is a significant 
predictor only for the first legislative term. Overall, members of the Permanent Bureau of the 
Chamber are almost three times less likely to serve as committee chairs, an effect which is 
mostly driven by the 2008 sample. Finally, district magnitude has a positive effect, mostly 
consistent across legislative terms, on getting a committee chair. 
 
Chair selection in the most important committees 
A relatively recent parliamentary survey (Stefan 2010) asked the MPs which are the 3 most 
important standing committees. The most frequently mentioned were: the budget and finance 
committee (29.6%), the committee dealing with legal issues, discipline and immunities (25.3%), 
the public administration and environment committee (10.4%) and the labor and social 
protection committee (9.8%). We ran the conditional logistic regression separately for these 
four committees and for the rest to see whether there are any important differences in the 
patterns of chair selection.  
 
Table 4 about here 
 
                                                          
8 The plot was created with the user written STATA command parmest (Newson 2003). 
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The results for committee types confirm and strengthen the conclusions reached for the 
longitudinal analysis. The main effects (sector knowledge, chair seniority and party leadership) 
are present in both samples. For the most important committees, parties still put a premium on 
pre-existing expertise, and not on the policy specialization acquired through committee 
leadership. Thus, there is strong empirical support for sector knowledge (H1), policy 
specialization via chair seniority (H2a), while party leadership also matters greatly (H3). With 
respect to the latter, its effect is on a par with that of sector knowledge for the most salient 
committees and it is much stronger for the rest. Similarly, sector knowledge matters more than 
chair seniority for the most important committees, while the reverse is true for the rest of the 
committees. For the latter, a longer parliamentary career is also a significant asset.  
This goes in line with our theoretical and empirical argument according to which 
political parties employ an institutional perspective, rather than a distributive one, in 
nominating committee chairs. When selecting politicians for this position, parties are likely to 
choose those with knowledge and sector expertise that will boost their image and arguably 
help achieve partisan goals (e.g. shape policy, keep tabs on ministers etc.). Moreover, visibility 
is higher in the important committees compared to the less important ones. With the partial 
exception of district magnitude none of the control variables make a difference for the 
selection of chairs in either type of committee. Figure 2 below illustrates comparatively the 
magnitude of these effects for the two types of committees. 
 
Figure 2 about here 
 
Conclusion 
This article analyzed the determinants of committee chair nomination under specific 
informational and organizational constraints in a young European democracy. To this end, it 
tested the explanatory power of the MPs' sector knowledge, legislative experience and party 
credentials using a longitudinal dataset that allows to assess variation over time. The main 
findings indicate that sector knowledge is of great importance in the first parliamentary terms 
and overall in committees of high importance. Specialized legislative experience (i.e. chair 
seniority) becomes more prominent as time passes and the same is true for party leaders. The 
explanatory power of these three features weigh considerably more than any other factors 
analyzed.    
The implications of this single case study reach beyond its context and have broad 
importance for the study of parliamentary committees. At theoretical level, we propose a 
model that applies to contexts in which legislators face high informational and organizational 
constraints. Our contribution to the existing literature is the identification of particular 
conditions under which expertise and political experience play a role in the legislative career. At 
the same time, the analytical model has a longitudinal component which illustrates that effects 
are likely to change over time. Such an analytical framework could travel to other countries 
facing regime change and transition towards democracy, but would also represent a valid point 
of reference in future comparisons with established democracies. Regarding the latter, their 
longitudinal variation may not be due to transition challenges but rather to dramatic changes in 
the structure of parliament composition (e.g. the access of new parties, change of electoral 
system). At empirical level, previous research linked parliamentary professionalization to re-
13 
 
election rates and the accumulation of local and party experience. This analysis went one step 
further and analyzed how party related mechanisms may influence policy specialization. It 
revealed that policy specialization is indeed a criterion for committee chair selection after the 
initial institutionalization of the Parliament is achieved and professionalization becomes the 
new target. These two types of contributions add to the comparative literature and set the 
grounds for further research. One of the immediate directions is a cross-national test that 
would include several new and established European democracies. Such a test could offer 
further insights regarding the explanatory potential of the framework, particularly when faced 
with different party characteristics and legislative features.  
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Appendix 1: Variable Codebook 
Variable Operationalization 
Chair  0 = no; 1 = yes 
Sector knowledge 0 = none; 1 = the MP has either academic training or a 
professional career in the committee's policy area; 2 = the MP 
has both academic training and a professional career in the 
committee's policy area. 
Chair seniority 0 = the MP was not a chair in the same committee in previous 
legislative terms; 1 = the MP chair of the same committee in 
previous legislative terms. 
Committee office 
seniority 
0 = the MP was not secretary or deputy chair in the same 
committee in previous legislative terms; 1 = the MP secretary 
or deputy chair of the same committee in previous legislative 
terms. 
Committee seniority  0 = the MP was not a member of the same committee in 
previous legislative terms; 1= the MP was a member of the 
same committee in previous legislative terms.  
Other committee office 0 = the MP had no committee office in the previous term; 1 = 
the MP was committee chair or vice-chair in the previous 
legislative term. 
Length of 
parliamentary career 
Years of membership in Parliament before the election in the 
current term.   
National party office 0 = no national party office; 1= The MP had a party leadership 
position at national level prior to his election in that term. 
Electoral security The difference between the party list share of seats (for the 
PR terms) or the candidate share of votes (for the 2008 term) 
and the effective electoral threshold. 
District magnitude Natural logarithm of the district magnitude. For the 2008 
elections we used the natural logarithm of the number of 
SMDs in the constituency (i.e. county). 
Mandate duration Days of membership in the Parliament in the analyzed term.   
Chamber office 0 = no office; 1= The MP was a member of the Permanent 
Bureau of the Chamber during the analyzed period. 
Number of committee 
memberships 
Number of committee the MP was member of during the 
term (including standing, special, inquiry committees, and 
joint standing committees with the Senate). 
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Table 1: The Powers of Parliamentary Committees in Romania 
Dimension Score 
Information acquisition  
Number .67 
Correspondence .9 
Minister 1 
Civil servants 1 
Staff 1 
Rewrite authority  
Initiate 0 
Rewrite 1 
Stage 1 
Control of the committee timetable  
Timetable 0 
Index of committee strength 0.73 
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics of dependent variable and covariates (1992-2012) 
Variable types Variables Mean Std. dev Min. Max. N 
DV Chair or deputy chair 0.05 0.22 0.00 1.00 2079 
Expertise Sector knowledge 0.90 0.92 0.00 2.00 2079 
 
Legislative 
experience 
Chair seniority 0.02 0.12 0.00 1.00 2079 
Committee seniority 0.13 0.34 0.00 1.00 2079 
Committee office seniority 0.05 0.21 0.00 1.00 2079 
Other committee office 0.05 0.22 0.00 1.00 2079 
Length of parl. career 1.81 3.11 0.00 18.08 2079 
Party influence National leader 0.26 0.44 0.00 1.00 2079 
 Electoral security 0.20 0.19 -0.36 0.88 2079 
 Chamber office 0.06 0.24 0.00 1.00 2079 
Controls No. committee mbs. 1.88 1.05 1.00 7.00 2079 
 Mandate duration 1366.91 298.65 17.00 1488.00 2079 
 District magnitude 2.13 0.49 1.10 3.37 2079 
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Table 3: Determinants of committee chair selection per legislative term  
 Pooled 2008  2004 2000 1996 19929 
Sector knowledge 1.67*** 1.46 1.37 2.30** 1.94* 1.38 
 (0.23) (0.46 (0.40) (0.94) (0.67 (0.50) 
Chair seniority 6.26*** 9.65** 6.47* 12.75 3.44  
 (3.53) (9.31) (7.14) (25.23) (6.77)  
Committee seniority  1.16 1.01 1.93 0.48 0.22 2075.68 
 (0.39) (0.69) (1.26) (0.59) (0.21) (20339.89) 
Committee office seniority 1.41 0.55 1.83 2.63 1.12                   
 (0.64) (0.56) (1.73) (2.68) (1.27)                   
Other committee office 1.24 1.35 0.67 0.95 0.53  
 (0.51) (0.92) (0.60) (1.12) (0.73)  
National leader 2.37*** 3.06** 3.52** 5.17*** 0.82 0.31 
 (0.53) (1.45) (1.82) (3.00) (0.53) (0.28) 
Length of parl. career 1.05 1.08 1.00 1.01 1.22 0.03 
 (0.04) (0.06) (0.08) (0.12) (0.18) (0.17) 
Electoral security 1.22 18.28 4.48 3.72 0.08 0.16 
 (0.71) (34.33) (6.86) (4.97) (0.14) (0.31) 
Chamber office 0.37* 0.05** 1.29 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 (0.19) (0.06) (0.87) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
No. comm. membership 1.00 0.75 1.07 0.87 0.92 2.37**  
 (0.11) (0.15) (0.25) (0.29) (0.36) (1.01) 
Mandate duration 1.00* 1.00 1.00 1.01 1.13 1.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.02) (18.48) (0.00) 
District magnitude 1.59** 1.69 1.55 0.90 1.13 3.46**  
 (0.31) (0.76) (0.63) (0.45) (0.61) (1.92) 
N 2079 462 423 348 361 338 
McFadden's R2 0.12 0.26 0.16 0.29 0.17 0.29 
Notes: Significance at * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. 
Cell entries are odds ratios. Standard errors in parentheses 
 
 
 
                                                          
9For this model data on 'Office seniority' and 'Past committee office' are missing because we did not have 
information on the MPs' committee positions in the previous term - we knew only their membership. 
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Table 4: Determinants of chair selection by committee importance (1992-2012) 
 Most important  
committees 
Other  
committees 
Sector knowledge 2.36*** 1.39*   
 (0.62) (0.23) 
Chair seniority 3.44 10.38*** 
 (5.14) (6.75) 
Committee seniority  1.38 1.21 
 (0.86) (0.48) 
Committee office seniority 1.96 1.67 
 (1.92) (0.89) 
Other committee office 0.94 1.11 
 (0.88) (0.55) 
National leader 2.20* 2.54*** 
 (0.90) (0.69) 
Length of parl. career 0.95 1.08*   
 (0.09) (0.04) 
Electoral security 0.91 1.28 
 (0.97) (0.90) 
Chamber office 0.32 0.47 
 (0.35) (0.28) 
No. comm. membership 0.92 1.07 
 (0.20) (0.14) 
Mandate duration 1.00 1.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) 
District magnitude 2.13** 1.32 
 (0.73) (0.32) 
N 593 1486 
McFadden's R2 0.14 0.14 
Notes:Significance at * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01 
 Cell entries are odds ratios.Standard errors in parentheses 
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Figure 1: Estimated effects with 95% confidence intervals based on the pooled model 
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Figure 2: Estimated effects with 95% confidence intervals for the two types of committees 
 
 
